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Abstract
Understanding the mechanism through which nancial globalization a¤ects eco-
nomic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and benets of opening nancial
markets. This paper is a rst attempt at disentangling the e¤ects of nancial inte-
gration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP)
and investments. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 70 countries observed
between 1975 and 1999. The results for both de jure and de facto indicators sug-
gest that nancial integration has a positive direct e¤ect on productivity, while it
does not directly a¤ect capital accumulation. I control for indirect e¤ects of nancial
globalization through nancial development and banking and currency crises. While
the evidence on nancial depth as an indirect channel is weak, the results are more
robust for nancial crises: they depress both investments and TFP, and are favored
by nancial integration, though only to a minor extent. The overall e¤ect of nancial
liberalization is positive for productivity and negligible for investments.
JEL Classication: G15, F43, O40, C23
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1 Introduction
Academic economists and practitioners have long debated over the e¤ects of nancial
globalization on growth.1 The removal of restrictions on international capital transactions
has on some occasions been welcome as a growth opportunity and in others blamed for
triggering nancial instability and crises. Yet, this debate has not addressed empirically
the mechanism through which nancial liberalization a¤ects growth. How do the main
sources of growth - total factor productivity (TFP) and capital accumulation - react to
nancial globalization? This issue is of particular relevance for at least two reasons. First,
understanding how TFP and investments are a¤ected by nancial liberalization would
allow us to identify which models are more appropriate to analyze and predict the economic
e¤ects of nancial globalization. Second, answering the question above would greatly help
understand the welfare e¤ects of nancial integration. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)
show that, whether capital or TFP react to nancial openness, matters signicantly for
the size of welfare gains (or losses).2 There are, to my knowledge, no studies that address
this important issue. This paper is a rst attempt at disentangling the e¤ects of nancial
globalization on productivity and capital accumulation.
The theoretical literature proposes various mechanisms through which nancial glob-
alization may a¤ect economic performance. In a standard neo-classical framework, open-
ing international capital markets generates capital ows from capital-abundant towards
capital-scarce countries, thereby a¤ecting growth in the poor countries through an accel-
eration in the convergence process. This e¤ect however is short-lived, since the steady
state (or the balanced growth path) is not a¤ected. This argument would nd empirical
support if capital accumulation in poor countries accelerated after nancial liberalization,
and TFP did not react. If credit rationing were added to the neo-classical framework
above, also productivity might be expected to increase, to the extent that capital inows
make more productive investments possible by relieving the economy from credit con-
straints (as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). The ndings (e.g. in Lucas, 1990) that
capital does not ow from rich to poor countries though, seems to make these mechanisms
less likely to apply. International capital mobility may also allow investors to diversify
risks by holding foreign assets, as suggested by Obstfeld (1994). Better portfolio insurance
fosters investments in risky projects with high expected productivity, as well as savings.
1Here nancial globalization is meant to be the absence of restrictions to international nancial trans-
actions. Henceforth, I will equivalently refer to it as (international) nancial liberalization, nancial
integration, or nancial openness.
2Their quantitative exercise points out that the benets from an acceleration in capital accumulation
along the convergence to the steady state, are way smaller (up to a ftieth) than the gains from an
improvement in productivity, hence in the steady state to which the economy converges.
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While higher savings would imply a positive e¤ect on capital accumulation, the outcome
of international portfolio reallocation on capital and productivity would vary across coun-
tries, hence be undetermined on aggregate. Yet another approach could be considering
nancial globalization similar to trade in goods. By exerting a pro-competitive e¤ect on
the capital markets, nancial openness would induce rms of all countries to use capi-
tal more e¢ ciently, thereby raising productivity without necessarily causing capital ows
across countries. As trade in goods, nancial integration might also foster specialization
in nancial services, which would improve allocative e¢ ciency by allowing rms to bor-
row at better conditions through specialized foreign intermediaries. Also, by giving rms
access to a wider range of nancial services, integration may allow them to use the most
appropriate ones, thereby gaining in e¢ ciency.
All of these models support the view that nancial integration a¤ects positively eco-
nomic performance. However, in a world characterized by market imperfections and weak
institutions, nancial integration could open the door to speculation, misallocation of cap-
ital and nancial instability (as for instance in Rodrik, 1998 and Stiglitz, 2000), thereby
leading to bad economic outcomes.
The models above give di¤erent predictions on the e¤ects of nancial globalization
on productivity and capital accumulation. If openness only promotes capital inows to
capital-scarce countries, thereby accelerating convergence, its positive e¤ect is expected
to be short-lived. If instead it raises TFP, it is most likely to spur long-term growth.
Understanding what model is supported by the empirical evidence may be of great help
to assess if nancial globalization has temporary or long-lasting e¤ects on the wealth of
nations.
To investigate the mechanism through which international nancial liberalization af-
fects capital accumulation and TFP, I control for two indirect channels. First, nancial
globalization may foster nancial development (see Klein and Olivei, 1999), i.e. the avail-
ability of external nance to the private sector, which Beck et al. (2000) show to a¤ect
positively productivity but not investments.3 To disentangle this channel, I rst include
in the regressions for TFP and capital a measure of nancial depth, such as the ratio of
credit to the private sector over GDP. Next, I separately address the links between nancial
integration and nancial depth, and between the latter and the sources of growth.
As another indirect e¤ect, nancial liberalization may trigger nancial instability, as
a wide literature points out (see Aizenman, 2001 for a survey on the evidence on nancial
3Financial development can be dened as the ability of a nancial system to reduce information asym-
metries between investors and borrowers, trade and diversify risk, mobilize and pool savings, and ease
transactions. Removing restrictions on international nancial transactions (nancial liberalization) may
a¤ect the way a nancial system carries over its functions, hence nancial development.
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liberalization and crises). Whatever the mechanism generating banking and currency
crises, such events may harm the ability of a nancial system to provide the economy
with credit. As a consequence, both investments in physical capital and innovation can
be expected to slow down. In the worst scenario, TFP might even drop, due to the need
for shutting down productive projects. I account for the e¤ects of nancial instability by
controlling all regressions for indicators of banking and currency crises. In this way, any
indirect e¤ect of liberalization through crises is removed from the estimates for the index
of nancial liberalization. I also estimate the joint e¤ect of crises and liberalization and
I explicitly address the link between nancial liberalization and nancial crises by means
of probit regressions.
I follow three methodologies to assess the e¤ects of nancial liberalization and nancial
crises on investments and productivity, and a fourth to address the link between liber-
alization and crises. Using a de jure zero-one indicator of capital account liberalization
provided by the IMF, I perform di¤erence in di¤erences estimation of the impact of regime
switches, between capital restrictions and openness, and between crises and normal times.
To this end, I use a panel data with yearly observations from at most 70 countries over the
period 1975-1999. I then turn to the long-run analysis and estimate equations for TFP
and capital growth rates as a function of initial conditions, nancial openness and the
other controls on a cross-section of 69 countries over a time span of 25 years. To overcome
problems of unobserved country-specic e¤ects and endogeneity of regressors, typical of
cross-sectional estimates, I apply the system GMM dynamic panel technique proposed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) on data at ve-year frequency.
To assess whether nancial liberalization favors the occurrence of nancial crises, I esti-
mate on the annual panel dataset a series of linear probability models for an indicator
of systemic and borderline crises (from Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003), and a dummy of
currency crises (from Glick and Hutchison, 2000). As a robustness check, I replicate the
estimates on the 5-year panel and the cross-section using Quinns (2007) more nuanced de
jure measure of capital account liberalization. Moreover, to further assess the robustness
of the results, I regress, at all frequencies, TFP and capital growth rates on a de facto
indicator of nancial integration provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007): the gross
external position (total foreign assets + liabilities) as a ratio of GDP.
The main results are the following. (1) International nancial liberalization has a
positive direct e¤ect on TFP, especially in developed countries. (2) The direct e¤ect on
capital accumulation is nil in the medium and long run, negative at annual frequency. (3)
Banking and currency crises generally harm both capital accumulation and productivity.
However, (4) nancial liberalization raises only the probability that minor banking crises
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occur in developed countries and has virtually no e¤ect on the likelihood of currency crises.
(5) There is weak support for the hypothesis that nancial integration a¤ects productivity
and investment by promoting nancial depth.
This paper is mainly related to four strands of literature. The studies on growth
and development accounting has shown that a large share of cross-country di¤erences in
economic performance is driven by total factor productivity (TFP) rather than factor
accumulation (physical and human capital).4 Hall and Jones (1999) point out that a
substantial share of the variation in GDP per worker is explained by di¤erences in TFP
and provide evidence that productivity is to a large extent determined by institutional
factors. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that also GDP growth di¤erentials are
mainly accounted for by di¤erences in the growth rates of TFP. These results suggest that,
if nancial globalization is to a¤ect the wealth of nations, it is more likely to do it through
its impact on TFP, rather than factor accumulation. This is indeed the main empirical
result of the paper.
Several authors suggest that nancial development spurs GDP growth by fostering
productivity growth, not only by raising the funds available for accumulation. Theoretical
papers by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2005), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005b) among others show that nancial development may
relieve risky innovators from credit constraints, thereby fostering growth through techno-
logical change. While earlier contributions (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) suggest
that nancial development spurs growth simply by increasing participation in production
and risk pooling, in more recent works the relationship is also driven by advances in pro-
ductivity. King and Levine (1993), and, in more detail, Beck Levine and Loayza (2000)
show evidence of a strong e¤ect of nancial development on TFP growth, and only a ten-
uous e¤ect on physical capital accumulation. This paper, similarly in spirit to Beck et al.
(2000), analyzes separately the e¤ects of nancial integration on TFP and investments.
Moreover, it partially encompasses their exercise, by assessesing whether nancial depth
works as an indirect channel through which globalization a¤ects productivity and capital
accumulation.
Many papers, extensively summarized in Prasad et al. (2003 and 2006) address the
e¤ects of nancial globalization on economic growth and volatility, from di¤erent perspec-
tives and with various datasets and empirical methodologies. Some studies (for instance,
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, Kraay, 2000 and Rodrik, 1998) nd that nancial liberal-
ization does not a¤ect growth, others that the e¤ect is positive (Quinn, 1997, Levine, 2001
4See Caselli (2005) for a survey on the develpment accounting literature, and Easterly and Levine (2001)
for the stylized facts on development and growth accounting.
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and Bekaert et al., 2005 among others), yet others that it is negative (Eichengreen and
Leblang, 2003). These e¤ects are also shown to be heterogeneous across countries at di¤er-
ent stages of institutional and economic development (see Bekaert et al., 2005, Chinn and
Ito, 2003 and Edwards, 2001), with di¤erent macroeconomic frameworks (Arteta Eichen-
green and Wyplosz, 2001), and adopting a di¤erent sequence of other nancial reforms
(see Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002 and Bekaert et al., 2005). Perhaps surprisingly, very
little evidence exists on the e¤ects of nancial globalization on the main sources of growth:
productivity and capital accumulation.5 Chari and Henry (2002) nd signicant e¤ects of
equity market liberalization on investments and the Tobins Q of listed rms, and conclude
that these must be driven by changes in productivity, which they do not explore directly.
A call for studies on the relationship between nancial globalization and productivity is
in Kose et al. (2006).
The link between nancial globalization, crises and growth has been widely debated
during the last twenty years. A series of empirical contributions (see Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1999 and Glick and Hutchison, 2000) provide evidence that the occurrence of
currency and banking crises is associated to the absence of capital account restrictions.
Works by Leblang (2003) and Bordo et al. (2001) however nd nancial liberalization to
be negatively correlated with the onset of currency crises. A recent work by Glick, Guo
and Hutchison (2006), shows that once the self-selectionbias is addressed by means of
a matching and propensity score methodology, capital account liberalization lowers the
probability of currency crises. The present paper does not aim at studying in depth the
determinants of nancial crises. Rather, I perform probit estimations for the occurrence of
banking and currency crises in order to evaluate the overall e¤ect of nancial integration
on productivity and capital accumulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey introduces the
empirical strategy, and describes the dataset and the variables used in the analysis. Section
3 presents the econometric methodologies and reports the estimation results for capital
and TFP. Section 4 investigates further the indirect e¤ects of nancial integration through
nancial crises and nancial development. Section 5 discusses the evidence in the previous
sections and proposes an explanation that is in line with the results of other empirical
studies. Section 6 concludes.
5Some preliminary evidence on nancial integration and productivity is in Kose, Prasad and Terrones
(2006).
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2 Empirical strategy and the data
The previous studies on the impact of nancial liberalization on growth have estimated
various versions of the equation:
dyit = b0 + b1yit 1 + b02Zit + b3IFLit + eit; (1)
where dyit  d log (Yit) is the growth rate of GDP in country i, yit 1 is the logarithm
of lagged GDP, Zit is a vector of control variables, IFLit is an indicator of nancial
liberalization, and eit is the error term.
The literature on growth and development accounting has shown total factor produc-
tivity (A) and capital (K) accumulation to be the main determinants of cross-country
di¤erentials in GDP growth rates. This paper, instead of considering Y , focuses on its
main components and proposes estimates of the following equation:
Pit = 0 + 
0
1Xit + IFLit + uit;
where Pit represents in turn A, K or their growth rates in country i at time t, X is a vector
of control variables, IFL the indicator of nancial integration, and u the error term.
I perform the analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset with annual observations for at
most 70 countries, spanning from 1975 to 1999. Depending on the econometric methodol-
ogy in use, I consider, in turn, the whole yearly panel, a cross-section of 69 countries with
data averaged over the sample period, and a panel comprising up to 70 countries with
non-overlapping ve-year observations over the same period. The following subsections
describe the main variables I include in the regressions: TFP, the stock of physical capital,
the three measures of nancial integration, the indicators of nancial crises and the other
control variables.
2.1 Capital accumulation
I retrieve the series of the physical capital stocks, K, applying the perpetual inventory
method as in Hall and Jones (1999) on data from the Penn World Tables 6.1. I estimate
the initial stock of capital, Kt0 as
It0
g+ , where g is the average geometric growth rate of
total investments between t0 and t0+ 10.6 In the paper t0 is 1960, since I have data on
investments dating back to that year for most countries.7 A depreciation rate  of 6 per
cent is assumed. The following values of the capital stock are easily computed as Kt =
6 Investments are dened as I = ki*rgdpch*pop from the PWT 6.1.
7 In the countries which have no data for 1960 t0 is the rst year followed by at least 15 observations.
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(1  )Kt 1+ It.
2.2 Productivity
I construct the series of total factor productivity following the Hall and Jones (1999)
approach to the decomposition of output. I assume the production function in country i
to be
Yi = K

i (AiHiLi)
1  ;
where Yi is the output produced in country i, Ki is the stock of physical capital in use, Ai
is labor-augmenting productivity, Li is the labor in use (rgdpch* pop/ rgdpwok from the
PWT 6.1), and Hi is a measure of the average human capital of workers (HiLi is therefore
human capital-augmented labor).8 The factor share  is assumed constant across countries
and equal to 1/3, which matches national account data for developed countries. I adopt
the following specication for labor-augmenting human capital as a function of the years
of schooling, si:
Hi = e
(si):
I rely on the results of Psacharopulos(1994) survey and specify  (si) as a piecewise linear
function with coe¢ cients 0.134 for the rst four years of education, 0.101 for the next four
years, and 0.068 for any value of si > 8.
Equipped with data on capital, output per worker, population and schooling (from
Barro and Lee, 2001), I can compute the series of total factor productivity as
Ai =
Yi
Li
1
Hi

Ki
Yi
  
1 
:
2.3 Financial integration
I use three di¤erent measures of nancial integration. First, throughout all econometric
specications, I use a de jure dummy indicator of capital account liberalization, CAL,
that takes value 0 if a country has held restrictions on capital account transactions by the
residents during the year, and 1 otherwise. The existence of restrictions is classied on
a 0-1 basis by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER), which is available for a maximum of 212 countries over the
period 1967- 1996.9 The major limit of this indicator is that it does not capture the
8 In Hall and Jones (1999) Yi is rgdpch*pop from the PWT, net of the value-added of the mining
industry. Following Caselli (2005), I simplify and take rgdpch*pop.
9Classication methods have changed in 1996, so that there are now 13 separate indexes that can hardly
be compared to the previous single indicator. Miniane (2000) harmonized the classications, though for a
8
extent to which countries take advantage of the absence of restrictions by trading capital
internationally. Despite this and the other limits summarized in Edison et al. (2002),
CAL is the most commonly used indicator of international nancial liberalization.
Second, for robustness, I also use the de jure index of capital account liberalization
compiled by Quinn, that is available on a yearly basis for a small number of developed
countries (18 in my sample), while it covers 142 countries (60 in my sample) with observa-
tions for 1958, 1973, 1982, 1988, and 1997. This indicator (Quinn), taking values between
0 (total restriction) and 100 (perfect capital account liberalization), is based on the infor-
mation provided in the AREAER about restrictions on residents and non-residents, and
takes into account the severity of restrictions across all categories of nancial transactions.
In order to maximize the overlap with the sample covered by the dummy indicator (CAL),
I use Quinn only in 5-year panel and 25-year cross-sectional regressions.
Third, to estimate the e¤ects of the actual participation of a country in international
capital markets (de facto nancial integration), I take as an indicator its gross external
position as a ratio of GDP. This variable, IFIGDP= (Total Foreign Assets + Foreign Total
Liabilities)/GDP, was built by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (rst release 2001, second 2007)
using assets and liabilities data on FDI, equity portfolios, debt, derivatives and o¢ cial re-
serves adjusted for valuation, and is available for 145 countries over the period 1970-2004
(67 countries between 1975 and 1999 in my sample). Note however that the debt compo-
nent of this indicator includes sovereign debt (assets and liabilities), and countriesdebts
with o¢ cial creditors such as the IMF, which abstract from the conventional denition of
nancial integration. It follows that even countries where capital account transactions are
forbidden to private agents (classied as closed by any de jure index) may have gross for-
eign debt positions and be therefore considered de facto integrated with the international
nancial markets. This implies that the estimates for IFIGDP may confound the e¤ects
of sovereign foreign debt with those of liberalizing private cross-border transactions. This
problem could be solved by subtracting sovereign foreign debt positions from IFIGDP,
but data are not available at this level of disaggregation.
I overcome the limits of the de jure dummy and the de facto measure by regressing
TFP and capital accumulation on CAL, IFIGDP and their interaction. The estimates for
CAL*IFIGDP capture the e¤ect of de facto integration in countries that do not impose
restrictions on capital account transactions.
limited number of countries, and over a short time span.
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2.4 Financial Crises
When accounting for nancial crises, I distinguish between banking and currency crises.
For banking crises (BC ), I adopt the anecdotal indicator proposed by Caprio and Klinge-
biel (2003), who keep record of 117 systemic and 51 non-systemic crises occurring in 93 and
45 countries respectively, from the late 1970s and onwards. On a yearly base, the variable
BC takes value 2 or 1 if the country has experienced a systemic or borderline banking
crisis, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Caprio and Klingebiel label a crisis as systemic if a
substantial proportion of bankscapital has been exhausted and borderline if the losses
were less severe. To make this denition criterion clearer, I refer to a few episodes. The
1991 crisis in Sweden was systemic, since it involved insolvency or serious di¢ culties for
90 per cent of the banking system. The isolated failures of three UK banks between the
eighties and the nineties, as well as the solvency problems of Credit Lyonnais in France in
1994-95, are instead labeled as borderline crises.
I rely on Glick and Hutchison (2000) for the chronology of currency crises (CC ). They
label as currency crises large variations (i.e. exceeding the sample mean plus twice
the country-specic standard deviation) in an exchange rate pressure index, dened as a
weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly reserve losses. On a
yearly base, the variable CC takes value 1 if the country has experienced such a large
variation, 0 otherwise. This dummy is available for 90 countries between 1975 and 1997.
For robustness check, I also use the banking and currency crises dummy variables
compiled by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001) for 56 countries
between 1973 and 1997 (available for 21 of them since 1880).10 An episode qualies as a
currency crisis (CC_BEKM-P= 1) if either of the following occurs: (1) a forced change
in parity, abandonment of a pegged exchange rate, or an international rescue; (2) the
index of exchange market pressure exceeds a critical threshold.11 The dummy for banking
crises, BC_BEKM-P, takes value 1 if a systemic banking crisis as dened in Caprio and
Klingebiel (2003) occurs, 0 otherwise.
2.5 Other controls
Financial depth. I proxy it with the ratio of total credit to the private sector over GDP
(privo from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001) and its growth rate. This variable gives a
measure of the external nance available to rms. I control for privo in the equations for
10Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), among others, used these indicators.
11The exchange pressure index is calculated here as a weighted average of the percentage change in the
exchange rate, the change in the short-term interest rate, and the percentage change in reserves, all relative
to the same variables in the center country. The threshold is 1.5 standard deviations above the mean.
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both investments and productivity to disentangle the direct e¤ect of liberalization from
the indirect one through nancial depth.12 I include the growth rate of privo in the linear
probability models for nancial crises, to account for the possibility that crises come along
as by-products of sustained growth of the nancial system (see Ranciere et al., 2007 and
Tornell et al., 2003). Moreover, following Glick et al. (2006) among others, I control for
nancial development when analyzing the determinants of capital account liberalization.
Initial real per capita GDP (rgdpch from the PWT 6.1) accounts for di¤erent
stages of economic development. It is often claimed that richer countries are more likely
to have open nancial markets, hence the e¤ect of nancial liberalization might seem
spurious if initial GDP is not controlled for. If adding this variable to the regressions does
not take away signicance from the coe¢ cient for nancial liberalization, the suspects of
spuriousness are less sound.
I include government expenditure as a ratio of GDP (kg from the PWT 6.1) in the
regressions for capital accumulation. Several theories predict that government expenditure
crowds out private investments. If this is the case, I should expect a negative coe¢ cient
in the equation for capital accumulation. I also use it as a covariate for the likelihood of
both capital account liberalization and nancial crises.
I control for openness to trade, proxied by import plus export as a ratio of GDP
(openk from the PWT 6.1). Trade may a¤ect the e¢ ciency of an economy through sev-
eral channels, such as specialization according to comparative advantage, access to larger
markets with more product variety and increased competition. These e¤ects may in turn
stimulate both capital accumulation and productivity growth. Openness to trade is also
included among the determinants of capital account liberalization and nancial crises.
Intellectual property right protection is expected to enhance productivity by giving
incentives for innovation. This is controlled for by using the measure (ipr) by Ginarte and
Park (1997), which is available for ve-year periods from 1960 to 1990.
I include a measure of deposit insurance (depins from Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci,
2000) among the covariates for crises, since Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) show
that the existence of explicit deposit insurance increases the likelihood of bank runs and
thus crises of the banking sector.
I also control for ination (from the World Development Indicators) as a determi-
nant of banking and currency crises crises. I take this variable as an indicator of bad
macroeconomic policies, which are likely to make a country prone to crises.
12Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine (2001) show that nancial liberalization promotes nancial devel-
opment, which, according to Beck et al. (2000), may be expected to foster productivity more than capital
accumulation.
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It may be argued (see among others Glick et al, 2006) that countries with a larger
current account exposition are more incline to change the degree of restrictions on capital
account transactions. Hence, I include the current account as a share of GDP (from
the IFS statistics) among the covariates for capital account liberalization.
It is claimed that governments may be more incline to remove restrictions on capital
account transaction if the real interest rate paid on the international nancial markets is
low. Therefore, I also control for the US long term real interest rate (from the IFS
statistics) as a determinant of capital account liberalization.
Finally, I use indicators of economic and institutional development to check
for heterogeneity in the e¤ects of nancial liberalization and banking crises on both in-
vestments and productivity. In the cross-sectional estimates for TFP growth I explicitly
control for institutional quality proxied by the Government Anti-Diversion Policy index
(GADP , built as Hall and Jones, 1999 with annual data from the International Country
Risk Guide). I also use it as a covariate for capital account liberalization. As an indicator
of economic development, I construct a dummy (LDC0s) that takes value 1 if the country
is dened as low or middle-low income in the World Development Indicators, and 0 oth-
erwise. In the panel regressions, I use these indicators to construct interaction terms with
the proxies of nancial integration.13
3 The empirical analysis
This section explains the methodologies I follow to assess the e¤ects of nancial integration
on capital accumulation and productivity, and reports the results. I rst present the
di¤erence in di¤erence approach applied to yearly panel data, then I turn to the long-
run cross-sectional analysis using twenty-ve year averages, to conclude with the dynamic
panel regressions performed on non-overlapping ve-year observations.
3.1 Panel difference in difference
I fully exploit the cross-sectional and time-series information in the annual dataset and
estimate
Pit = 0 + 
0
1Xit 1 + IFLit 1 + i + t + "it; (2)
where Pit is a proxy for the outcome variable (either log(K) or log(A) in the various spec-
ications) observed in country i at year t, X are control variables including the indicators
13This gives equivalent results to interacting nancial integration either with initial real per capita GDP,
or with a dummy for countries with real per capita GDP below sample average. The results are available
upon request.
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of nancial crises BC and CC and IFL is an indicator of nancial liberalization. To
alleviate the simultaneity bias, all regressors enter as lagged values. I start by considering
the de jure dummy for capital account liberalization (CAL). i is a country-specic xed
e¤ect capturing heterogeneity in the determinants of P that are specic to i, and its inclu-
sion in (2) implies that  is only estimated from the within-country variation around the
liberalization date. Including the year xed e¤ects (t) allows me to compare the change
in P between the pre and post-reform periods in countries that have liberalized with the
change in the countries that maintained the restrictions. This means that equation (2) is a
di¤erence in di¤erencespecication, since it implies di¤erencing out the time-mean for
each i, and the common trend for all is at any t. Two main problems may undermine the
ability of  to identify a causal link from nancial liberalization to the sources of growth.
First, there may be concerns about the selection of the countries that liberalized. Sup-
pose that fewer episodes of liberalization were observed among countries that share a cer-
tain characteristic C, and that the countries with characteristic C experienced particularly
low productivity. Then this trend in productivity, specic to countries with characteristic
C, may bias the estimated e¤ect of nancial integration upwards. To tackle this issue, I
rst identify the most important factors that inuence the decision to liberalize capital
account transactions, by estimating the following probit on the annual panel dataset:
Pr (CAL_rit = 1) =  (o + 1Xit) :
CAL_rit, with r 2 fin; outg is an indicator of the reforms observed in country i at time
t, and Xit is a set of covariates.14 CAL_in equals 1 if a switch into capital account
liberalization occurs, zero otherwise. CAL_out equals 1 if restrictions are put in place,
zero otherwise. I also estimate a probit for the unconditional probability that restric-
tions are not in place, i.e. Pr (CAL = 1). The coe¢ cient estimates in Table B represent
the percentage changes in probability associated to an increase in the covariates. The z-
statistics reported below each coe¢ cient are derived from robust standard errors, clustered
by country. Consistently with the evidence in Glick et al. (2006), countries with higher
nancial development are more likely to be nancially open, while they are not more likely
to adopt, nor to abandon, capital account liberalization. The probability of switching into
liberalization is expectedly higher where institutions are better.15 Interestingly, continent
14Following Glick et al. (2006), I include among the covariates the current account as a ratio of GDP, the
US real interest rate, government expenditure, openness to trade, and a measure of institutional quality
(gadp). I also control for the occurrence of banking and currency crises in the previous year and continental
dummies.
15Current account over GDP has no signicant e¤ect across the specications in Table B, meaning
that large current decits do not call for capital restrictions. However, if taken in absolute value current
13
dummies are among the best predictors of reforms. After nding a geographical pattern
in the selection of liberalized countries, I check if there are systematic di¤erences in pro-
ductivity and investments across areas (Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe + North
America). Table C reports statistics on all measures of nancial integration, TPF growth
and capital accumulation across continents. Rows 1 and 2 contain, respectively, the num-
bers of reforms into and out of capital account liberalization, while row 3 indicates the
number of country-years with CAL= 1. Note that Africa, accounting for more than one
third of the sample, has the least number of capital account reforms and a very bad per-
formance in terms of productivity growth. On the other hand, Europe and North America
have the highest incidence of unreverted capital account liberalizations and the worst in
capital accumulation. This suggests that the di¤erence in di¤erence estimates for  might
be a¤ected by selection bias. To amend this bias, I control the regressions for continental
trends in both productivity and capital.
A problem of endogeneity of policy changes may also arise. Suppose a country opens
up when experiencing an economic crisis to help the recovery or alternatively when it is
already on a sustained growth path. This may attribute a negative or positive e¤ect to -
nancial liberalization which is actually due to a trend, thereby producing biased estimates.
As a solution to this problem, I control for a dummy taking value 1 during the three or
ve years prior to the liberalization and zero otherwise. Comparing the coe¢ cient for this
dummy with  allows me to verify whether the change in P was part of a previous trend or
followed liberalization. As a robustness check, I replace the dummy variable with a trend
variable, taking values 1, 2 and 3, respectively three, two and one years before the reform.
Moreover, I assess whether both reforms into and out of capital account liberalization
(opening when a country is closed and closing when a country is open) promote economic
performance, to test if countries systematically adopt the reform that fosters growth.
A concern about the consistency of di¤erence in di¤erence estimators may arise if the
dependent variable is autocorrelated, as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004). In this
case, the standard errors of the coe¢ cient  would be underestimated, thereby biasing
the t-statistics towards over-rejection of the null  = 0. Bertrand et al. (2004) propose
several methods to get around this problem. I will follow their suggestion and estimate
equation (2) without CAL, save the residuals only for the countries that experienced a
reform, and regress them on CAL.16 This is equivalent to identifying  o¤ the di¤erence
in the residuals before and after the reform.
account desplays positive and signicant coe¢ cients, suggesting that countries with a large current account
exposure, irrespectively of its sign, are more incline to liberalize capital transactions.
16This procedure is referred to as ignoring time series information in Bertrand et al. (2004).
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The evidence produced with di¤erence in di¤erence estimations is suggestive, since it
gives a measure of the di¤erential in economic performance explained by a clear-cut reform.
As it is frequently pointed out in the literature though, the extent of nancial integration
cannot be fully captured by a zero-one indicator. There are many di¤erent restrictions
that can be removed at di¤erent times, so that countries that are equally labeled as open
by the AREAR dummy may actually enjoy di¤erent degrees of nancial integration. Also,
the extent to which an open country is active in the global capital market may vary over
time. Using the de facto measures of nancial integration described above allows me to
take into account these concerns. Hence, I replicate most of the analysis considering the
de facto measure IFIGDP instead of CAL, and then both indicators jointly with their
interaction.
3.1.1 Capital
Table 1a reports the results from the di¤erence in di¤erence regressions for the logarithm
of physical capital stock, log(K), on yearly data. The specication in columns 1 and 2 only
includes the de jure indicator of capital account liberalization (CAL), whose e¤ects on
investments are negative. These coe¢ cients are robust to controlling for trends in capital
up to three years prior to liberalization (CAL_switch3) and for time-continent e¤ects, as
reported in column 2.17 Columns 3 and 4 show that banking crises (BC) and nancial
integration have a negative e¤ect on capital accumulation, while currency crises seem to
be irrelevant. Moreover, the estimates for the interactive terms CAL*BC and CAL*CC
in column 4 suggest that nancial crises do not have di¤erent e¤ects across closed and
open countries. The interaction analysis in columns 5 and 6 shows that capital account
liberalization restrained capital accumulation less in developing countries, as well as in
Latin America and Africa (where it was even benecial). Column 7 does not support the
hypothesis that nancial integration has di¤erent e¤ects across the rst and the second
half of the sample period (pre and post 1985). When I control for real per capita GDP,
government expenditure and credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP (column 8), the
results for CAL, and CC remain unchanged, while BC becomes positive and signicant.
The coe¢ cients in column 8 also show that countries with higher per capita GDP and
government expenditure accumulate more capital, while nancial depth (as proxied by
privo) is uninuential. The results are robust to the inclusion of openness to trade, whose
coe¢ cient always turns out to be insignicant and is thus omitted.
To check the robustness of these results to changes in the indicators of nancial integra-
17The results do not change if I use CAL_switch5, which equals 1 for the ve years prior to the reform.
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tion and crises, I replicate some of the estimations of Table 1a replacing the de jure index
CAL with the de facto measure IFGDP , and substituting BC and CC (from Caprio and
Klingebiel, 2003 and Glick and Hutchison, 2000, CK-GH henceforth) with BC_BEKM-
P and CC_BEKM-P (from Bordo et al., 2001). The results are reported in Table 2a.
In column 1, I regress capital on de facto nancial integration and crises from CK-GH.
While banking crises lose signicance, the gross external position has a negative impact on
capital. As mentioned above, the estimates for IFIGDP may deliver a distorted picture
of the link between nancial globalization and economic outcomes, especially if countries
that are de jure closed have large sovereign debt positions (such as most of the African
countries in Table C). To account for this potential distortion, in column 2 I control also
for de jure liberalization CAL and its interaction with the de facto measure. The coef-
cients for IFIGDP and IFIGDP*CAL suggest that countries with large gross external
positions su¤ered a drop in physical capital if de jure closed, while they were not a¤ected
if de jure open. This result is consistent with the coe¢ cients reported in column 3 for
the interactions of IFGDP with continental dummies. The only countries that su¤ered
from external nancial exposition were the African ones, that were mostly de jure closed
as shown in Table C. The interaction with the LDCs in column 4 does not display a
signicant heterogeneity in the e¤ect of nancial liberalization. In columns 5-7, I consider
the alternative set of nancial crises indicators proposed by Bordo et al. (2001). In so
doing, I loose observations for 13 countries, but add two years to the time series. The
picture does not change signicantly: both de jure and de facto indicators have a negative
coe¢ cient if considered separately (columns 5 and 6), while the e¤ect of gross external
positions on capital is nil in de jure open and negative in de jure closed countries (as from
column 7). Neither banking nor currency crises have a signicant link with capital stock.
Table 3a reports robustness checks on the di¤erence in di¤erences estimates with the
maximum number of controls, reported in column 8 of Table 1a. The rst two columns
refer to the correction proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004). In column 1, I report the
results from regressing the physical capital stock on all control variables but CAL, and
controlling for country and time xed e¤ects. As in column 8 of Table 1a, the coe¢ cients
for banking crises, real per capita GDP and government expenditure are positive and
signicant, while those for currency crises and nancial depth are nil. I saved the residuals
from the estimation in column 1 only for the countries that experienced a regime shift in
capital account restrictions, and regressed them on CAL. The coe¢ cient and its standard
error in column 2 conrm that nancial integration reduces signicantly capital by more
than 8 per cent. In columns 3 and 4 I try to identify the e¤ect of a policy switch out
of nancial openness. In column 3, I restrict the attention to those countries that were
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not closed all the time, and regress capital stock on the usual controls plus an indicator
that takes value one if there is not nancial openness and zero otherwise. In this way,
the coe¢ cient compares the change in capital stock before and after the adoption of
restrictions in the countries that closed their nancial markets with the change in K in
the countries that remained open. The e¤ect is positive and signicant. In column 4, I
take the full sample and regress K on an indicator that equals 0 if a country is open in a
given year or if it is closed throughout the entire sample, and 1 otherwise. The positive
and signicant coe¢ cient for CAL_off suggests that capital rose in countries that closed
their nancial markets compared to the countries that were open or remained closed ever.
These results prove that regime switches out of nancial liberalization have the opposite
e¤ect of switches into it. In columns 5-7, I control in alternative ways for the pre-reform
trends in physical capital. In column 5, I decompose the dummy CAL_switch in two
dummies for switches on and o¤ liberalization. In column 6, these dummies are no longer
step dummies, but take the form of a three-period linear trend in the three years prior to
reforms. In both cases their introduction does not a¤ect the signicance of the coe¢ cient
for nancial openness. In column 7 I add a pre-reform trend for each country that has
liberalized. This helps me account for other reforms that countries may have adopted just
before capital account liberalization. Also in this case, no signicant change occurs with
respect to the other regressions.
Overall, countries that removed the restrictions on capital account transactions ex-
perienced up to a 14 per cent drop in physical capital compared to those that did not.
Countries that doubled their gross external position over GDP (IFIGDP) had a 6 to 16
per cent drop if they kept capital restrictions, while they were not a¤ected if they removed
them. The occurrence of a banking and currency crisis may reduce capital, raise it or even
leave it unaltered: the results are not robust across di¤erent samples.
3.1.2 Productivity
Tables 1b, 2b and 3b report the results from the di¤erence in di¤erence regressions for
TFP levels, log (A), on yearly data. The coe¢ cients for de jure liberalization (CAL)
reported in Table 2a are positive and signicant across all specications in columns 1-
8. Banking crises have a negative and signicant e¤ect on TFP under all specications,
while the negative coe¢ cient for currency crises is signicant (at ten per cent condence
level) only in columns 3 and 5. As in the regressions for capital, the interactions between
de jure liberalization and nancial crises of column 4 show that the e¤ects of banking
and currency crises do not di¤er across open and closed countries. The interactions with
continental dummies in column 5 suggest that the impact of capital account liberalization
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is positive all over, though stronger in African countries. The statistically zero coe¢ cients
for CAL*LDCs and CAL post 85 in columns 6 and 7 exclude di¤erent e¤ects of nancial
integration on productivity between developed and developing countries, as well as across
the rst and the second half of the sample period. Column 8 shows that intellectual
property right protection, as expected, raises TFP, and that richer countries tend to have
higher productivity. Despite the inclusion of real per capita GDP, the coe¢ cient for CAL
remains positive and signicant, which does not lend support to the argument that open
countries perform better in terms of TFP simply because they are also richer. Notice that
the estimate for privo is not signicantly di¤erent from zero, suggesting that nancial
depth may not be an e¤ective indirect channel linking liberalization and productivity.
In Table 2b, I replicate for productivity the exercise reported for capital in Table
2a. Controlling for the CK-GH set of nancial crises, I do the following: regress TFP
on IFIGDP (column 1); add to this specication CAL and its interaction with the de
facto measure (column 2); interact IFIGDP with dummies for Africa and Latin America
(column 3) and LDCs (column 4). Controlling for the BEKM-P set of nancial crises, I
regress TFP on CAL (column 5), replace CAL with IFIGDP (column 6) and add CAL
plus its interaction with IFIGDP (column 7). As in Table 1b, banking crises have a
negative coe¢ cient throughout all specications, while the estimates for currency crises
are signicant only when Bordo et al (2000) indicators are used (columns 5-7). At rst,
the estimates for de facto nancial integration alone, in column 1, would suggest that
larger external capital positions hinder productivity. The coe¢ cients in column 2 however
tell that de facto integration does spur TFP when accompanied by de jure liberalization.
Large gross external positions in presence of de jure restrictions may be arguably com-
posed by sovereign foreign debt and loans from o¢ cial creditors (e.g. the IMF). In line
with this argument, column 3 shows that an increase in gross external positions reduced
productivity in African and Latin American countries (hinging greatly on foreign sovereign
debt and o¢ cial loans), while it spurred TFP in the rest of the world. The interaction
with the dummy for LDCs in column 4 suggests that nancial integration was produc-
tivity enhancing in the developed countries, not in the developing ones. The robustness
analysis with nancial crises indicators from Bordo et al. (2001), in columns 5-7 conrms
the previous results. Notice that 13 countries, mainly African and Latin American, are
dropped from the sample when changing crises indicators. Their exclusion explains the
loss of signicance for the de facto measure alone in column 6.
Table 3b reports robustness checks on the di¤erence in di¤erences estimates of column
8 in Table 1b. The rst two columns refer to the correction proposed by Bertrand et al.
(2004). In column 1, I report the results from regressing TFP on all control variables but
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CAL, country and time xed e¤ects. Column 2 shows the coe¢ cient estimated regress-
ing on CAL the residuals from the specication in column 1 only for the countries that
experienced a reform to capital account restrictions. Banking crises and per capita GDP
maintain the coe¢ cients of column 8 in Table 1b, and nancial integration is shown to
raise signicantly productivity by almost 8 per cent. In columns 3 and 4 I try to identify
the e¤ect of a policy switch out of nancial openness as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3a.
The coe¢ cient for CAL_o¤ in column 3, suggests that TFP dropped after the adoption
of restrictions in the countries that closed their nancial markets relative to the countries
that remained open. In column 4, I take the full sample and regress TFP on an indicator
that equals 0 if a country is open in a given year or if it is closed throughout the entire
sample, and 1 otherwise. The negative and signicant coe¢ cient for CAL_off suggests
that productivity dropped in countries that closed their nancial markets compared to
the countries that were open or remained closed ever. These results prove that regime
switches out of nancial liberalization have not the same, positive e¤ect of switches into it.
In columns 5-7, I control in alternative ways for the pre-reform trends in TFP. In column
5, I decompose the pre-reform trnd dummy CAL_switch into two dummies for switches on
and o¤ liberalization. In column 6, these dummies are no longer step dummies, but take
the form of a three-period linear trend in the three years prior to reforms. In both cases
their introduction does not a¤ect the signicance of the coe¢ cient for nancial openness.
Column 7 reports the result from adding a pre-reform trend for each country that has
liberalized. Again, no signicant changes occur with respect to the other regressions.
Overall, countries that removed the restrictions on residentscapital account transac-
tions experienced a 5 to 8 per cent rise in TFP compared to those that did not. Countries
that doubled their gross external position over GDP (IFIGDP) had a 1 per cent increase
in productivity if they did not lift capital restrictions, while they enjoyed a 10 per cent
rise if they did so. The occurrence of a banking and crisis reduces TFP by 3 to 5 per cent,
while currency crises may be accompanied by a 2-3 per cent drop, which is signicant only
for the BEKM-P indicator.
3.2 Cross-sectional analysis
To study the e¤ects of nancial openness on TFP and capital in the long run, I estimate
the following growth regressions:
dpi(t 25;t) = 0 + pit 25 + 
0
1Xi(t 25;t) + IFLi(t 25;t) + uit; (3)
19
where dpi(t 25;t) = 100
log(Pit) log(Pit 25)
25 with p = log (P ), P 2 fA;Kg, and the regressors
indexed by (t  25; t) are 25-year period averages. A coe¢ cient estimate ^ < 0 indicates
that there is conditional convergence. The speed of convergence b can be obtained from
 =  1001 eb2525 . As for the di¤erence in di¤erence regressions presented above, I start
by considering IFL = CAL, and then replicate the analysis for the other measures of
nancial integration, IFL = Quinn and IFL = IFIGDP .
Tables 4a and 5a report the results for capital accumulation. The coe¢ cients for the
capital stock at the beginning of the period (k_25 ) are always negative and signicant,
suggesting that, other things equal, countries starting with a lower endowment experience
a faster growth of physical capital. Contrary to the di¤erence in di¤erence analysis, the
estimates for nancial depth are positive and signicant. All other control variables in
Table 4a, including the CK-GH indicators of nancial crises, are irrelevant to explain
investments in the long run. Only the coe¢ cient for capital account liberalization in
Latin American is signicant, and negative. In columns 1-7 of Table 5a, controlling the
regressions of capital growth for the CK-GH indicators of nancial crises, I do the following:
replace the de jure dummy of capital account liberalization with the de facto measure
IFIGDP (column 1); include in the specication both indicators and their interaction
(column 2); interact IFIGDP with dummies for continents (column 3) and LDCs (column
4); use Quinns de jure index (column 5); interact it with continent (column 6) and LDCs
dummies (column 7). Higher gross external positions spur capital accumulation in de jure
open countries, hinder it where residents cannot access international nancial markets.
Consistently with this result, investments grow with the exposition to foreign capital
markets in all countries but the African and Latin American ones. The e¤ect of de jure
liberalization is nil if proxied by Quinns index. In columns 8-11, I control for the BEKM-
P set of nancial crises indicators and for: the IMF de jure capital account liberalization
index; the de facto measure of nancial integration; both indicators and their interaction;
and Quinns index. No signicant link between nancial globalization and investments
emerges from these estimates.
Tables 4b and 5b report the results for TFP growth rate. The coe¢ cients for the
initial level of TFP do not support robustly the hypothesis of conditional convergence
in productivity. The e¤ects of banking and currency crises on TFP growth are negative
but only occasionally signicant. In Table 4b, the IMF de jure proxy for capital account
liberalization has a positive and signicant coe¢ cient under the basic specication in
column 1, controlling only for banking and currency crises. The same holds in columns
4 and 5, where I also interact CAL with dummies for Africa and Latin America, and
LDCs. As in the di¤erence in di¤erence annual estimations, de jure liberalization does
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not spur productivity in developing countries, and mainly in the Latin American ones,
while it is denitely benecial in the others. The interactions in column 3 show capital
account liberalization to have the same e¤ect across countries that experienced banking
or currency crises and those that did not. Financial depth, in columns 6 and 7, has a
positive e¤ect on long run productivity growth. In Table 5b, I replicate for TFP growth
the exercise done in Table 5a for investments. The results in columns 1-4 are consistent
with the di¤erence in di¤erence estimates on annual data. De facto nancial integration
spurs productivity where it is accompanied by de jure liberalization. It is also benecial
in countries outside Africa and Latin America, and mainly in the developed ones. This
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that increases in IFIGDP that are not due to
changes in sovereign foreign debt or loans from international organizations raise TFP. The
positive and signicant coe¢ cients for Quinns de jure index in columns 5 and 6 provide
robustness to the evidence for CAL of Table 4b. Column 8 replicates the estimation of
column 1 using the BEKM-P set of banking and currency crises, and thereby dropping 11
African and Latin American countries from the sample. Consistently with the evidence of
column 4, the coe¢ cient for IFIGDP alone is now positive and signicant.
In sum, the long-run analysis provides some evidence that nancial integration spurs
productivity growth, mainly in the developed countries, while it has no signicant impact
on capital accumulation. As emphasized by the empirical growth literature, cross-sectional
estimates have several limits. They do not allow me to exploit the time-series variation
in the data on nancial integration, which is particularly important when assessing the
e¤ects of reforms; and cannot control for omitted variables, country-specic e¤ects and
endogeneity of the regressors. In this case, addressing endogeneity with an instrumental
variable strategy is rather di¢ cult. Legal origins may be a good instrument for nancial
development (see La Porta et al, 1997), but do not seem particularly suitable to instrument
a variable as CAL, which involves policy changes and perhaps reversals over the sample.
The same argument applies to continental dummies, that stand in Table B among the best
predictors of capital account liberalization. Other good predictors, such as the quality of
institutions and nancial development are known to be an important determinant of TFP
(see, among others, Hall and Jones, 1999) and investments, and hence do not seem valid
instruments for CAL nor for the other indicators of IFL.
3.3 Dynamic panel analysis
To exploit the time variation in the proxies of IFL, I could estimate equation (3) on a
panel dataset, assuming uit = i+ t+ "it, but this would generate consistency problems.
As the right-hand side of equation (3) includes the lagged dependent variable (pt  ),
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even if "it is not correlated with pt  , the estimates are not consistent, given the nite
time span. Moreover, consistency may be undermined by the endogeneity of other ex-
planatory variables, as in the cross-sectional estimates. To correct for the bias created
by lagged endogenous variables, and the simultaneity of some regressors, I follow the ap-
proach proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). I estimate
the following system with GMM
dpit = 0 + dpit 5 + 
0
1dXit + dIFLit + dt + d"it (4)
pit = 0 + pit 5 + 
0
1Xi(t 5;t) + IFLi(t 5;t) + i + t + "it; (5)
where dpit equals log( PitPit 5 ) with P2 {K, A}, and the other regressors are the same as
in the previous equations. Variables indexed by (t   5; t) are averages over the period
between t-5 and t. i, t and "it are the unobservable country- and time-specic e¤ects,
and the error term, respectively. The presence of country e¤ect in equation (5) corrects
the omitted variable bias. The di¤erences in equation (4) and the instrumental variables
estimation of the system are aimed at amending inconsistency problems. I instrument
di¤erences of the endogenous and predetermined variables with lagged levels in equation
(4) and levels with di¤erenced variables in equation (5). For instance, I take pit 15 as
an instrument for dpit 5 and IFLit 10 for dIFLit in (4) and dpit 10 as an instrument
for pit 5 and dIFLit 5 for IFLit in (5). I estimate the system by two-step Generalized
Method of Moments with moment conditions E[dpit 5s ("it   "it 5)] = 0 for s  2, and
E[dzit 5s ("it   "it 5)] = 0 for s  2 on the predetermined variables z, for equation
(4); E[dpi;t 5s (i + "i;t)] = 0 and E[dzi;t 5s (i + "i;t)] = 0 for s = 1 for equation (5).
I treat all regressors as predetermined. The validity of the instruments is guaranteed
under the hypothesis that the residuals from (4) are not second order serially correlated.
Coe¢ cient estimates are consistent and e¢ cient if both the moment conditions and the
no-serial correlation are satised. To validate the estimated model, I apply a Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions, and a test of second-order serial correlation of the residuals.18
As pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991), the estimates from the rst step are more
e¢ cient, while the test statistics from the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will
report coe¢ cients and statistics from the rst and second step respectively. Note that in
this case the speed of convergence b obtains from  = e5b.
Tables 6a and 7a report the dynamic panel regressions for capital (p=log(K)). The
estimates for k_5 in both tables conrm the prediction of the neoclassical growth model,
18 Including too many lags among the instruments can cause the power of the Sargan test to collapse,
potentially hiding the invalidity of instruments (see for example Bowsher, 2002). To avoid this problem, I
restrict the number of lags to t-10 and t-15.
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that capital accumulation slows down as capital grows up towards its steady state value,
and also that there is conditional convergence across countries. In Table 6a, the coe¢ cients
for de jure capital account liberalization (CAL) are not signicantly di¤erent from zero, in
line with the ones reported in Table 4a. Banking crises (BC ) depress investments, while
the results for currency crises (CC ) are not robust. Table 7a rejects the hypothesis that
nancial integration, proxied by any of the three indicators in use, has an impact on capital
accumulation, with the exception of Latin America, where it may lower investments.
The estimates for TFP are reported in Tables 6b and 7b. Both tables support ro-
bustly the existence of conditional convergence in productivity, with an implied speed of
convergence of about 5-6 per cent per year. Under all specications in Table 6b, capital
account liberalization (CAL) is shown to spur productivity growth, and banking crises are
proven harmful for it, while currency crises are irrelevant. Trade does not seem to have
a signicant e¤ect on TFP growth, nor does nancial depth, as reported in column 6 of
Table 6b. The interactions CAL*BC and CAL*CC in column 4 suggest that the negative
e¤ects of nancial crises were more severe in open countries. Columns 6 and 7 prove
nancial liberalization to be overall benecial for productivity, though to a lesser extent
in the developing countries (column 7) and especially the Latin American ones (column
6).19 The regressions in Table 7b show the positive impact of nancial liberalization on
TFP to be robust to the adoption of any of the three de jure and de facto measures of
integration, and the two sets of nancial crises indicators. As in the previous di¤erence
in di¤erence and cross-sectional analyses, the positive e¤ect of nancial globalization is
stronger where gross external positions are accompanied by de jure liberalization, and
weaker in countries that rely more heavily on foreign sovereign debt and loans from in-
ternational organizations, such as the developing countries, mainly the African and Latin
American ones.
Quantitatively, over a ve-year period, a country that liberalizes according to the
AREAER outperforms a closed one in TFP by 12 to 19 per cent (by 1 per cent if LDC,
26 if developed country). This leads to a long-run di¤erence in TFP of about 60 per
cent (coe¢ cient 0.609, standard error 0.299), which is consistent with the results from the
cross-section. Similarly, TFP grows 14 per cent more in a country scoring a Quinns index
of capital account liberalization twice as another. Moreover, doubling de facto integration
(IFIGDP) implies raising productivity by more than 2 per cent in ve years (7.5 per cent
19The total di¤erence in productivity (growth) between a developed country that was open and one that
was closed during the whole 5-year period would be about 26 per cent. The di¤erence would be just 1 per
cent in the case of developing countries. Similarly, an open Latin American country would enjoy a less
than 3 per cent higher TFP (growth) than a closed one, while an open country in the rest of the world
would outperform by 19 per cent.
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if the country is also de jure open). Whatever measure of nancial openness is adopted,
capital grows along the same path in both closed and open countries.
The results above suggest that, over a one to ve-year period, nancial liberalization
has a robust positive direct e¤ect on TFP, while it hardly a¤ects capital accumulation,
and if so it does it in a negative way. Given that the two main sources of GDP growth
are not a¤ected to the same extent by nancial globalization, it seems reasonable that the
literature has struggled to establish a signicant and robust empirical relationship between
nancial integration and GDP growth. To corroborate this claim, I report in Table 8 the
results from estimating the system (4)-(5) for real aggregate GDP, using the three measures
of nancial liberalization. Consistently with many papers in the literature, the IMF de jure
indicator obtains statistically zero coe¢ cients, while the estimates for Quinns gradual de
jure index and the de facto measure are positive. Nevertheless, having shown that TFP
benets from nancial integration, the non robust evidence for GDP growth should no
longer be a concern, since the literature on growth accounting tells us that what really
matters in the long run is productivity.
4 The indirect channels
In this section I explore more in depth two indirect channels through which nancial
globalization may a¤ect productivity and investments: banking and currency crises and
nancial development.
4.1 Financial integration and financial crises
The analysis in the last section suggests that banking and currency crises may be detri-
mental for both capital accumulation and TFP. It is often argued that nancial instability
may be triggered by the exposure to international nancial markets. In this subsection, I
investigate if, and to what extent, the negative e¤ects of nancial crises should ultimately
be imputed to nancial liberalization. To do so, I estimate on the annual panel dataset
the following probit for the probability of a banking and currency crises:
Pr (Crisis_typeit = 1) =  (o + 1Xit + IFLit) :
The variable Crisis_typeit takes value one if a crisis of a given type (systemic, borderline,
any banking crisis, or currency crisis) has occurred in country i at time t, zero otherwise.
The vectorXit includes a series of covariates, and IFLit is a proxy of international nancial
liberalization. The coe¢ cient estimates represent the percentage changes in the probability
of a crisis associated to an increase in the covariates. The z-statistics reported below each
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coe¢ cient are derived from robust standard errors, clustered by country.
Table 9a reports the results for the probability of nancial crises as a function of the
de jure dummy for capital account liberalization (CAL) and a series of covariates. The
coe¢ cient estimates for CAL on the full sample (Panel A) are not signicantly di¤erent
from zero, with the exception of minor (borderline) banking crises, that are 1.7 per cent
more likely in liberalized countries. This evidence is in line with the recent ndings in
Glick et al. (2006) and Ranciere et al. (2006). High ination is generally responsible for a
higher likelihood of banking crises. High real GDP per capita and growth rate of nancial
depth signicantly reduce the probability of crises. The rst result is in line with the
predictions in Martin and Rey (2006), while the second seems to contradict the bumpy
pathhypothesis proposed by Ranciere et al. (2007) and Tornell et al. (2003). Splitting
the sample between developed and developing countries (panels B and C), I nd that CAL
increases the likelihood of (borderline) banking and currency crises in developed countries,
while it has no e¤ect in the developing ones. Higher per capita income is associated to
a lower likelihood of banking and currency crises, while ination raises the probability of
banking crises, regardless of the degree of development of a country. Faster growth of
nancial depth reduces the likelihood of crises only in the LDCs.
I replicate the estimations of Table 9a using the other indicators of nancial integration,
whose coe¢ cients I report in Table 9b.20 Capital account liberalization, as indexed by
Quinn, raises the probability of minor banking crises in all countries. The coe¢ cients
in the rst row of Table 9b suggest that a country switching from half to totally open
(Quinn=50 to 100) has a 22 per cent higher probability of su¤ering a minor banking crisis.
Its likelihood of experiencing a severe banking or a currency crisis remains unchanged. The
second row of Table 9b tells that the probability of a (systemic) banking crisis rises by 11
per cent in a developed country experiencing an increase in total foreign assets + liabilities
equal to its GDP (equivalent to a more than 80 per cent rise of IFIGDP in the average
European or North American country). The same change in foreign wealth would imply
a 7 per cent drop in the likelihood that a developing country su¤ers a currency crisis (this
would require the average African country to roughly double IFIGDP).
As argued in Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), the onset of a nancial crises may follow
capital account liberalization with some lag. If this were the case, the evidence in Tables
9a and 9b would not be capturing it, since it relies on one-year lags. To account for
delayed e¤ects of nancial liberalization, I replicate the probit estimations on the 5-year
20For parsimony, only the coe¢ cents for the proxies of IFL are reported. The estimates for the other
covariates (deposit insurance, real per capita GDP, ination, trade/gdp and the growth rate of privo) are
available from the author.
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averages of the IFL indicators and report the results in Table 9c. CAL only raises the
probability of minor banking crises in developed countries, Quinn does the same, but also
in the developing countries, IFIGDP keeps increasing the likelihood of systemic crises in
developed countries, while reducing the risk of currency crises in the LDCs.
Overall, accounting for the negative impact of nancial crises on TFP and investments,
and the generally small increase in the likelihood of crises that nancial integration gen-
erates, its net e¤ect remains positive for productivity, and nil to negative for capital
accumulation.
4.2 Financial integration and financial development
The previous section suggests that nancial depth does not a¤ect productivity and invest-
ments in a robust way, once the de jure dummy index of capital account liberalization
(CAL) is accounted for. Since this result looks at odds with the evidence in Beck et al.
(2000), it is worth expanding the analysis of the e¤ects of nancial development control-
ling also for the other indicators of integration (IFIGDP and Quinn). Table 10a reports
the results of di¤erence in di¤erence and DPD regressions of capital (Panel A) and TFP
(Panel B) on nancial crises, privo and alternative indicators of nancial integration. Fi-
nancial depth a¤ects positively capital accumulation throughout most specications, while
its positive impact on productivity is signicant only in half of the equations. In any case,
controlling for nancial development does not alter the coe¢ cients for liberalization in a
relevant way, compared to the results in Tables 2a-2b and 7a-7b. This does not exclude
that nancial depth be a channel through with nancial integration a¤ects productivity,
though it suggests that the indirect link may be weak.
To investigate if, and to what extent, the e¤ects of privo on capital accumulation
and productivity are due to nancial globalization, I regress private credit over GDP
on the IFL indicators and other control variables. The results in Table 10b do not
provide robust support to the existence of a link between nancial liberalization and privo.
Together with the evidence on the nexus between nancial development, productivity and
investments, this implies that nancial depth serves as a weak indirect channel between
nancial globalization and the sources of growth.
5 Discussion
The evidence in section 3 suggests that nancial integration is accompanied by an increase
in productivity. This e¤ect seems at odds with the theoretical predictions that nancial
liberalization would foster capital accumulation, and eventually raise TFP by relieving
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the economies from credit constraints.
A plausible way to rationalize this result is to draw a parallel between nancial integra-
tion and trade openness. In particular, one can interpret nancial openness as integration
in the market for nancial services. In a world with market imperfections, nancial services
(such as screening, monitoring, debt structuring, etc.) can be seen as an important factor
of production for rms that need to raise external capital. Since the quality and varieties
of nancial services are likely to di¤er across countries and sectors, nancial liberalization
may generate the typical gains from trade. Specialization allows rms in all countries to
buy any given nancial service at the best price. Moreover, the access to new varieties of
services may provide rms with the most appropriate nancial instruments, which spurs
productivity. This rise in TFP would be due to an increase in allocative e¢ ciency, which
is empirically documented by Galindo et al. (2005). As another consequence of nancial
liberalization and specialization in nancial services, one should observe nancial interme-
diaries enter foreign markets following comparative advantage patterns, as recent evidence
from microdata shows. For instance, the results in Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) suggest
that foreign banks enter more often in countries where banks are less e¢ cient, and Clarke
et al. (1999) show that they tend to serve the sectors in which they have more expertise.
Moreover, Claessens et al. (2001) document an overall e¢ ciency gain in the nancial
intermediation sector.
To the extent that better nancial services reduce the volatility in output (for instance
through e¤ective selection or monitoring of the borrowers), nancial integration may re-
duce the volatility of aggregate production of a country. On the contrary, in the models
that see nancial globalization mainly as an international portfolio diversication device
(e.g. Obstfeld, 1994), nancial integration tends to promote risk taking at the country
level, which raises output volatility. Table 11 reports results from OLS regressions of the
1975-1999 sample standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP on the indicators of
nancial integration and nancial crises. The negative and signicant coe¢ cients of IFL
seem inconsistent with the prediction of nancial globalization raising output volatility.
The same holds for TFP in columns 5-8.
Financial integration may also generate frictional unemployment due to the realloca-
tion of capital from less to more e¢ cient rms, as a consequence of the improvement in
the nancial services of screening and selection of borrowers. Looking at data on labor
and employment may be an interesting extension of the analysis in the present paper.
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6 Conclusions
A wide literature has focused on the e¤ect of nancial liberalization on GDP growth, often
nding mixed results. To better understand the e¤ect of nancial liberalization, however, it
is important to know the channels through which it operates. This paper has attempted to
probe deeper into the relationship by separately studying the impact of nancial openness
on two sources of income growth: capital accumulation and productivity. Contrary to the
existing literature, I nd fairly robust results, using both de facto and de jure indicators
of nancial integration. In particular, nancial liberalization has a positive direct e¤ect
on productivity, while it has virtually none on capital accumulation.
In my analysis I took into account two possible indirect channels through which nan-
cial globalization may a¤ect economic performance: nancial development and nancial
crises. The most interesting result applies to the latter factor. As expected, banking
and (to a minor extent) currency crises have a strong negative impact on economic per-
formance, though the likelihood that they occur does not rise much under nancial in-
tegration. In fact, globalization raises only the probability of minor banking crises in
developed countries. Nevertheless, the positive direct e¤ect of nancial liberalization on
TFP survives.
Finally, the paper briey discusses a possible explanation for the positive direct e¤ect
of nancial integration on productivity. The idea is that removing restrictions to inter-
national nancial transaction opens the door to trade in nancial services, which can be
considered as a production factor. As in trade models, openness generates gains from
specialization and widening of varieties, which raise e¢ ciency in the allocation of capital
in each and every country, thereby fostering TFP growth. This mechanism is supported
by some existing evidence on the pattern of internationalization of nancial intermedi-
aries, and on the allocative e¢ ciency of investments. Developing a theoretical foundation
of comparative advantage and di¤erentiation in nancial services, and testing it seem
interesting directions for future research.
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Country CAL_on CAL_off Country CAL_on CAL_off
Argentina 1967-1993 1970 Madagascar 1967 1968
Austria 1991 Malaysia 1973
Bangladesh Mali
Bolivia 1986 1981 Mauritius
Botswana Mexico 1982
Brasil Morocco
Burundi Mozambique
Cameroon 1967 1968 Nepal
Canada Netherlands
Chile New Zealand 1984
Colombia Nicaragua 1978
Costa Rica 1980-1995 1974-1982 Nigeria
Denmark 1988 Norway 1995
Ecuador 1971-1988-1995 1970-1986-1993 Panama
Egypt Paraguay 1982 1984
El Salvador Peru 1978-1993 1970-1984
Equatorial Guinea Philippines 1969
Ethiopia Portugal 1993
Finland 1991 Sierra Leone
France 1990 1968 Singapore 1978
Germany South Africa
Ghana Spain 1994
Greece Sri Lanka
Guatemala 1973-1989 1980 Sweden 1993
Guinea Bissau Switzerland
Hong Kong Thailand
Iceland Trinidad and Tobago 1994
India Tunisia
Indonesia 1969 Turkey
Italy 1990 Uganda
Jamaica United Kingdom 1979
Japan 1979 1995 Uruguay 1978 1968-1993
Jordan Venezuela 1984
Kenia Zambia
Korea Zimbabwe
Note. CAL_on and CAL_off report the dates of removal and adoption, respectively, of
restrictions on capital account transactions. (source: IMF). All countries enter panel
estimations, Mauritius is not included in the cross-section.
Table A
Countries, samples and financial liberalization dates
Current Account -0.017 0.001 -0.001 -0.019 0.001 -0.001 ** -0.022 ** 0.001
-1.590 0.720 -0.610 -1.560 1.130 -2.140 -2.280 1.190
US real interest -0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.033 *** -0.003 0.001 -0.035 *** -0.002
-1.160 -0.180 0.500 -2.590 -1.590 1.230 -3.120 -1.610
Government (lgov) 0.024 0.000 -0.001 0.120 0.004 -0.002 0.142 0.002
0.310 0.030 -0.200 1.510 0.660 -0.710 2.110 0.480
Trade (lopen) -0.043 0.015 *** 0.006 -0.086 0.010 0.004 -0.113 * 0.005
-0.550 2.650 1.380 -0.910 1.580 0.910 -1.720 0.920
Private Credit (lprivo) 0.216 *** 0.006 -0.001 0.217 *** -0.004 0.003 0.131 ** -0.004 **
3.960 1.480 -0.650 3.210 -1.010 1.000 2.240 -0.850
GADP 0.039 0.008 * -0.003 * 0.036 0.007 *
0.760 1.880 -1.870 0.750 1.660
Banking Crisis (BC) -0.003 -0.012 * 0.004 -0.031 -0.014 ** 0.002 -0.016 -0.011 **
-0.080 -1.860 1.140 -0.870 -2.100 0.620 -0.560 -2.040
Currency Crisis (CC) -0.044 -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.042 -0.001
-1.110 -0.870 -0.310 -0.070 -0.530 0.300 0.910 -0.130
Asia 0.668 *** 0.006
3.390 0.360
Latin America 0.583 *** 0.041 ***
3.810 2.440
Europe & N. America 0.635 *** 0.027
2.780 1.040
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.058 0.044 0.242 0.105 0.115 0.381 0.152
Observations 965 962 962 612 611 611 612 611
Table B
Capital account liberalization - yearly panel - dprobit
Note. CAL, CAL_in and CAL_out indicate capital account liberalization, and the switches into and out of it, respectively.
The coefficients in theese columns are estimated with probit and represent the increase in the probability of capital account
liberalization (and its swicthes) associated with a per cent change in the covariates. Asia, Latin America and Europe & N.
America are continental dummies. All covariates enter as lagged values. A constant is included in all regressions. The
robust standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficiant is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per
cent level, respectively.
CAL CAL_in CAL_out CAL CAL_in CAL_out CAL CAL_in
Asia Africa
Latin 
America
Europe & N. 
America
CAL_in 3 1 12 9
CAL_out 1 0 11 0
CAL 109 3 119 116
Banking Crises (borderline) 18 32 24 40
Banking Crises (systemic) 34 76 84 28
Currency Crises 28 64 44 29
Quinn 56 43 60 74
IFIGDP 145 102 150 120
Assets/GDP 63 21 44 53
Liabilities/GDP 82 82 105 66
Gross (FDI+Equity)/GDP 26 15 19 25
Gross Debt/GDP 99 74 121 84
TFP growth 1.122 -1.131 -1.515 0.106
K growth 7.306 3.769 3.075 3.003
Observations 286 508 396 310
Countries 13 24 18 15
Financial integration, crises and economic performance across continents
Note. Lines 1 and 2 report the number of switches into and out of capital account
liberalization (CAL_in and CAL_out). Lines 3-6 report the number of country-years with
CAL=1, BC=1, BC=2, CC=1, respectively. Quinn's index of financial liberalization is
averaged over 48, 60, 72 and 60 observations only. Continent sample averages are
reported for the de-facto indicators (IFIGDP and its components) and the growth rates of
TFP and Capital, all expressed as a percentage.
Table C
CAL -0.039 * -0.093 *** -0.084 *** -0.091 *** -0.158 *** -0.139 *** -0.077 *** -0.091 ***
0.023 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.036 0.034 0.028 0.022
CAL*BC 0.014
0.019
CAL*CC 0.009
0.041
CAL*Africa 0.214 *
0.119
CAL*Latin America 0.118 ***
0.044
CAL*LDC's 0.101 **
0.043
CAL post '85 -0.013
0.027
BC -0.014 * -0.017 ** -0.012 -0.013 * -0.014 * 0.021 ***
0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007
CC 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.015
0.015 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
lrgdpch 0.833 ***
0.041
lgov 0.051 **
0.021
lprivo -0.007
0.015
CAL_switch3 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.034 -0.032 -0.036 -0.019
0.023 0.022 0.059 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1497 1497 1432 1432 1432 1432 1432 1117
Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 61
CAL 0.124 *** 0.060 *** 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.047 * 0.062 ** 0.062 *** 0.075 ***
0.018 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.028 0.027 0.023 0.017
CAL*BC 0.000
0.015
CAL*CC 0.001
0.032
CAL*Africa 0.160 *
0.094
CAL*Latin America 0.004
0.036
CAL*LDC's -0.009
0.033
CAL post '85 -0.009
0.022
BC -0.041 *** -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.041 *** -0.041 *** -0.030 ***
0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
CC -0.020 * -0.020 -0.022 * -0.020 -0.020 -0.008
0.012 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011
lrgdpch 0.778 ***
0.030
lopen -0.008
0.016
lprivo -0.010
0.011
ipr 0.010 *
0.007
CAL_switch3 -0.350 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.022
0.709 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.014
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1461 1461 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 913
Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 59
86
6
7
Table 1a
Capital account liberalization and capital stock - yearly panel - difference in difference
1 2 3 4 5
8
Note. The dependent variables are (the logaritm of) the stock of physical capital (log(K)) in Table 1a, and TFP (log(A)) in
Table 2a. All regressors are in lagged values. CAL is a de jure dummy indicator of capital account liberalization. The
variable CAL_switch3 equals 1 in the 3 years prior to capital account reforms, zero elsewhere. LDC's indicates developing
countries. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. Robust standard errors are reported below each coefficient. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent confidence level respectively.
Table 1b
Capital account liberalization and TFP- yearly panel - difference in difference
1 2 3 4 5 7
IFL = CAL -0.139 *** -0.139 *** -0.272 ***
0.028 0.022 0.030
IFL = IFIGDP -0.019 *** -0.056 *** -0.008 -0.018 * -0.019 ** -0.160 ***
0.006 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.024
IFIGDP*CAL 0.056 *** 0.155 ***
0.014 0.023
IFL*Africa -0.176 ***
0.028
IFL*Latin America 0.001
0.014
IFL*LDC's -0.001
0.013
BC -0.010 -0.013 -0.007 -0.010 -0.017 -0.011 -0.007
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.014
CC 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.011 0.003 0.020 0.002
0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017
Time-continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 1521 1360 1521 1521 1431 1462 1325
Countries 67 67 67 67 54 54 54
IFL = CAL -0.047 ** 0.037 *** -0.056 ***
0.021 0.014 0.019
IFL = IFIGDP -0.015 *** -0.089 *** 0.021 *** 0.023 *** 0.005 -0.095 ***
0.005 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.015
IFIGDP*CAL 0.100 *** 0.103 ***
0.010 0.015
IFL*Africa -0.125 ***
0.022
IFL*Latin America -0.049 ***
0.011
IFL*LDC's -0.059 ***
0.010
BC -0.033 *** -0.027 *** -0.029 *** -0.030 *** -0.046 *** -0.051 *** -0.038 ***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.009
CC -0.019 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.026 *** -0.020 * -0.028 ***
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011
Time-continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 1492 1333 1492 1492 1390 1438 1303
Countries 67 67 67 67 54 54 54
CK-GH BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P
CK-GHCK-GHCK-GH
CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
Table 2a
International Financial Liberalization and capital stock - yearly panel - difference in difference
1 3 42 75 6
Note. The dependent variables are the logaritm of the stock of physical capital (log(K)) in Table 1a, and of TFP
(log(A)) in Table 2a. All regressors are in lagged values. CAL is a de jure dummy indicator of capital account
liberalization. IFIGDP is (Total Foreign Assets+Liabilities)/GDP. The variable CAL_switch3 is included in the
regressions of columns 4, 7 and 9. Crises source CK-GH refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Glick and Hutchison (2000) respectively. Crises source BEKM-P refers to the
banking and currency crises indicators of Bordo et al. (2000). The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. Robust
standard errors are reported below each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent
confidence level respectively.
Table 2b
International Financial Liberalization and TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference
5 6 71 3 42
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-PCK-GH
CAL -0.083 *** -0.090 *** -0.093 *** -0.081 ***
0.014 0.026 0.026 0.027
CAL_off 0.036 * 0.082 ***
0.02 0.019
BC 0.020 *** 0.041 *** 0.021 *** 0.013 0.013 0.014 *
0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
CC 0.017 0.009 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.012
0.015 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
lrgdpch 0.836 *** 0.719 *** 0.834 *** 0.888 *** 0.888 *** 0.909 ***
0.043 0.057 0.041 0.049 0.049 0.051
lprivo -0.010 0.029 -0.007 -0.024 -0.024 -0.026
0.015 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017
lgov 0.051 ** 0.026 0.051 ** 0.023 0.021 0.024
0.022 0.037 0.021 0.026 0.026 0.026
CAL_switch_in3 -0.037
0.023
CAL_switch_out3 0.025
0.033
CAL_switch_in_trend -0.017
0.011
CAL_switch_out_trend 0.005
0.015
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country pre-IFL trend No No No No No No Yes
Obs 1060 317 465 1117 875 875 814
Countries 61 17 31 61 59 59 57
CAL 0.077 *** 0.069 *** 0.072 *** 0.062 ***
0.013 0.019 0.019 0.020
CAL_off -0.039 ** -0.062 ***
0.02 0.015
BC -0.030 *** -0.041 *** -0.030 *** -0.029 *** -0.028 *** -0.028 ***
0.006 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
CC -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008
0.011 0.019 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
lrgdpch 0.778 *** 0.800 *** 0.777 *** 0.755 *** 0.755 *** 0.746 ***
0.031 0.056 0.030 0.035 0.035 0.036
lprivo -0.007 0.019 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
0.011 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012
lopenk -0.008 0.011 -0.007 0.003 0.003 0.000
0.016 0.029 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.018
ipr 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.012 * 0.012 * 0.012 *
0.007 0.012 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
CAL_switch_in3 0.020
0.016
CAL_switch_out3 0.005
0.024
CAL_switch_in_trend 0.008
0.008
CAL_switch_out_trend 0.009
0.011
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country pre-IFL trend No No No No No No Yes
Obs 934 291 375 931 814 814 814
Countries 59 17 29 59 57 57 57
Full Sample
Note. The dependent variables are the logaritms of the stock of physical capital (log(K)) in Table 1c, and of TFP
(log(A)) in Table 2c. All regressors are in lagged values. The indicator CAL_out takes value 1 if the country is
financially closed as a result of a closing reform. The variables CAL_switch_in3 and IFL_switch_out3 equal 1 in
the 3 years prior to capital account opening and closing, respectively. The same variables with _trend termination
take value 1, 2 and 3 respectively 3, 2 and 1 year prior to reform. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All
regressions include a constant. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is
significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 3b
Capital account liberalization and TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference
Bertrand et al. (2004) 
correction
No closed 
countries 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
5
Bertrand et al. (2004) 
correction
No closed 
countries 
Full Sample Full Sample
6 7
Full Sample Full Sample
1 2 3 4
3 4
Table 3a
Capital account liberalization and the capital stock - yearly panel - difference in difference
71 2 5 6
k_25 -0.300 *** -0.293 *** -0.293 ** -0.412 *** -0.279 ** -0.531 *** -0.432 **
0.115 0.113 0.115 0.138 0.125 0.185 0.216
CAL 0.736 0.707 0.759 2.035 0.508 -0.006 -0.119
0.789 0.832 1.196 1.295 0.895 0.847 0.826
CAL*Africa 4.395
7.182
CAL*Latin America -3.688 ***
1.333
CAL*LDC's 0.395
1.567
BC -0.692 -0.666 0.039 -0.730 0.190 0.199
1.079 1.212 1.217 1.096 1.274 1.216
CC 1.758 1.846 1.605 1.678 5.136 3.124
4.841 4.964 5.319 4.746 5.617 5.028
CAL*BC -0.121
3.410
CAL*CC -0.098
1.288
gadp -0.606
0.421
lprivo 1.194 ** 1.702 **
0.553 0.681
lopenk -1.005 -0.836
0.639 0.623
lgov 0.132 -0.258
0.576 0.597
R2 0.066 0.071 0.071 0.139 0.073 0.191 0.229
Obs 69 69 69 69 69 63 63
a_25 -0.275 -0.354 -0.329 -0.405 -0.401 -0.907 * -1.031 **
0.357 0.554 0.399 0.377 0.394 0.479 0.495
CAL 0.680 * 0.554 0.118 1.369 ** 1.130 ** -0.266 -0.177
0.420 0.434 0.834 0.556 0.566 0.365 0.387
CAL*Africa 10.502 **
4.211
CAL*Latin America -2.473 ***
0.668
CAL*LDC's -1.125 *
0.600
BC -1.492 -1.852 -0.971 -1.448 -1.386 -1.292
0.954 1.078 1.011 0.949 0.943 0.979
CC -2.107 -1.896 -3.048 -2.092 -1.938 -1.660
3.765 4.566 3.837 3.703 3.555 3.794
CAL*BC 2.189
1.586
CAL*CC -3.786
6.402
gadp 0.272
0.236
lprivo 0.903 *** 0.657 *
0.262 0.352
lopenk 0.229 0.166
0.319 0.386
ipr 0.203 0.151
0.397 0.434
R2 0.032 0.109 0.126 0.197 0.133 0.313 0.334
Obs 65 65 65 65 65 58 57
Note. The dependent variables are the 25-year average annual growth rates of physical capital (100*dlog(K)/25)
in Table 3a, and of TFP (100*dlog(A)/25) in Table 4a. All regressors are expressed as period average, except for
the logaritm of the initial capital stock and TFP level. CAL is the de jure dummy indicator of capital account
liberalization averaged over the sample period. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions
include a constant. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a
coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 4b
Capital account liberalization and TFP Growth - cross-section
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Table 4a
Capital account liberalization and Capital accumulation - cross-section
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k_25 -0.287 ** -0.421 *** -0.561 *** -0.371 ** -0.346 ** -0.654 *** -0.194 -0.329 * -0.376 ** -0.411 ** -0.280
0.127 0.133 0.155 0.145 0.148 0.171 0.195 0.182 0.191 0.206 0.191
IFL = CAL -1.063 0.636 -0.479
1.333 0.907 1.579
IFL = IFIGDP 0.048 -1.549 ** 0.281 ** 0.154 0.034 -1.045
0.217 0.656 0.121 0.201 0.259 1.025
IFIGDP*CAL 1.638 ** 1.079
0.683 1.033
IFL = Quinn -0.361 0.056 -0.061 -0.686
0.937 0.918 0.965 0.997
IFL*Africa -1.482 ** -0.520 **
0.737 0.246
IFL*Latin America -0.773 ** -0.628 ***
0.327 0.189
IFL*LDC's -0.365 0.346
0.274 0.251
BC -0.714 -0.418 -0.369 -0.421 -1.703 -0.249 -2.448 * -1.026 -0.555 -1.171 -1.619
1.113 1.083 1.104 1.166 1.178 1.264 1.319 2.453 2.488 2.607 2.513
CC 1.088 -1.086 0.979 0.435 2.354 2.161 2.757 -5.901 * -5.501 -5.994 -5.555
4.887 5.000 4.889 5.031 4.965 5.188 4.894 3.497 3.529 3.646 3.896
Crises Source
R2 0.062 0.144 0.162 0.077 0.120 0.261 0.155 0.100 0.111 0.138 0.097
Obs 66 66 66 66 59 59 59 54 54 54 52
a_25 -0.338 -0.167 -0.491 -0.567 -0.988 ** -0.637 -1.137 ** -0.687 ** -0.669 ** -0.708 * -0.889 **
0.475 0.379 0.411 0.437 0.500 0.452 0.480 0.334 0.333 0.365 0.427
IFL = CAL -1.382 ** 0.273 0.156
0.603 0.383 0.749
IFL = IFIGDP 0.031 -1.565 *** 0.269 *** 0.266 *** 0.191 ** 0.252
0.198 0.450 0.096 0.100 0.087 0.667
IFGDP*CAL 1.675 *** -0.075
0.467 0.666
IFL = Quinn 1.261 * 1.232 * 0.762 0.879
0.741 0.664 0.745 0.578
IFL*Africa -0.987 ** -0.091
0.455 0.139
IFL*Latin America -0.704 ** -0.398 ***
0.280 0.089
IFL*LDC's -0.748 ** -0.312 ***
0.289 0.098
BC -1.550 -1.338 * -1.378 * -1.162 -1.803 * -0.862 -1.291 -2.544 * -2.646 * -2.468 * -3.148 **
0.996 0.712 0.819 0.815 1.034 0.984 0.991 1.380 1.420 1.416 1.353
CC -1.499 -3.561 -1.839 -2.921 -0.586 -1.978 -1.279 -4.851 *** -5.453 *** -4.806 *** -4.558 **
3.799 3.519 3.397 3.101 3.980 3.758 3.677 1.592 1.525 1.699 1.745
Crises Source
R2 0.088 0.278 0.291 0.269 0.198 0.354 0.287 0.280 0.319 0.281 0.287
Obs 63 63 63 63 56 56 56 52 52 52 50
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-PCK-GH CK-GH
BEKM-PCK-GHCK-GH CK-GH CK-GHCK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
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BEKM-PBEKM-P
Table 5a
International Financial Liberalization and Capital accumulation - cross-section
3 6 7 9
BEKM-P
8 101 2 4 5
9
Note. The dependent variables are the 25-year average annual growth rates of physical capital (100*dlog(K)/25) in Table 3b, and of TFP (100*dlog(A)/25) in
Table 4b. All regressors are expressed as period average, except for the logaritm of the initial capital stock and TFP level. CAL is a de jure dummy indicator of
capital account liberalization, Quinn is a de jure indicator of capital account liberalization valued in [0,100], IFIGDP measures de facto financial integration.
Crises Source CK-GH refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Glick and Hutchison (2000) respectively. Crises
Source BEKM-P refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of Bordo et al. (2000). The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a
constant. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 5b
International Financial Liberalization and TFP Growth - cross-section
CK-GH CK-GH BEKM-PCK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
8 10 111 2 4 53 6 7
k_5 0.937 *** 0.958 *** 0.932 *** 0.974 *** 0.951 *** 0.963 ***
0.032 0.020 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.021
CAL 0.088 0.019 -0.002 0.034 0.092 0.005
0.062 0.054 0.055 0.052 0.068 0.071
CAL*BC -0.004
0.087
CAL*CC -0.406
0.347
CAL*Africa -0.014
0.073
CAL*Latin America -0.124
0.089
CAL*LDC's 0.070
0.108
BC -0.124 *** -0.049 * -0.111 *** -0.104 *** -0.109 ***
0.045 0.025 0.036 0.039 0.039
CC -0.336 -0.164 -0.268 -0.233 -0.254
0.222 0.185 0.181 0.169 0.175
lgov -0.039
0.060
lprivo 0.132 ***
0.040
lopenk -0.023
0.092
Sargan (p-val) 0.318 0.653 0.998 0.778 0.853 0.464
m2 (p-val) 0.780 0.324 0.723 0.31 0.391 0.277
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 344 344 278 344 344 344
Countries 70 70 61 70 70 70
Table 6a
Capital account liberalization and Capital accumulation - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the log of the end-of-period level of
capital stock. All regressors are log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The sample
spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with
the two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first
step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The
p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are
reported from the second step.
1 2 3 4 5 6
a_5 0.732 *** 0.737 *** 0.711 *** 0.785 *** 0.739 *** 0.707 ***
0.106 0.101 0.083 0.095 0.096 0.098
CAL 0.191 *** 0.187 ** 0.118 * 0.264 *** 0.192 *** 0.263 ***
0.071 0.081 0.070 0.089 0.064 0.072
CAL*BC -0.130 *
0.078
CAL*CC -1.345 *
0.592
CAL*Africa 0.134
0.086
CAL*Latin America -0.165 ***
0.089
CAL*LDC's -0.253 **
0.101
BC -0.106 ** -0.072 * -0.073 * -0.099 ** -0.089 **
0.049 0.039 0.045 0.043 0.041
CC 0.501 -0.040 0.549 0.135 -0.006
0.438 0.277 0.466 0.286 0.328
lopenk -0.012
0.082
lprivo 0.068
0.047
Sargan (p-val) 0.309 0.488 0.993 0.823 0.920 0.768
m2 (p-val) 0.661 0.724 0.864 0.898 0.959 0.935
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 331 331 268 331 331 331
Countries 68 68 59 68 68 68
Table 6b
Capital account liberalization and TFP - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the log of the end-of-period level of
TFP. All regressors are log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The sample spans
between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the
two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first step.
*, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-
values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are
reported from the second step.
1 2 3 4 5 6
k_5 0.969 *** 0.962 *** 0.957 *** 0.972 *** 0.958 *** 0.947 *** 0.986 *** 0.971 *** 0.969 *** 0.979 *** 0.994 ***
0.021 0.019 0.031 0.185 0.018 0.022 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.013
CAL -0.047 0.017 -0.068
0.061 0.038 0.059
IFIGDP -0.004 -0.052 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.067
0.008 0.041 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.051
IFIGDP*CAL 0.053 0.069
0.045 0.050
Quinn 0.022 0.047 0.062 -0.066
0.056 0.043 0.058 0.044
IFL*Africa -0.046 0.012
0.074 0.018
IFL*Latin America -0.030 * -0.027
0.016 0.025
IFL*LDC's -0.007 0.034 ***
0.012 0.010
BC -0.122 *** -0.080 ** -0.077 *** -0.109 *** -0.083 ** -0.054 -0.101 *** -0.105 *** -0.096 *** -0.062 * 0.011
0.037 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.043
CC -0.435 -0.443 * -0.504 * -0.400 0.113 -0.028 0.021 -0.372 ** -0.343 *** -0.319 ** -0.077
0.297 0.023 0.289 0.255 0.200 0.122 0.196 0.151 0.119 0.125 0.102
Sargan (p-val) 0.760 0.728 0.526 0.503 0.427 0.964 0.928 0.748 0.907 0.999 0.968
m2 (p-val) 0.545 0.702 0.617 0.546 0.784 0.845 0.524 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.850
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 332 328 332 332 216 216 216 321 336 336 268
Countries 67 67 67 67 60 60 60 54 54 54 52
a_5 0.791 *** 0.766 *** 0.777 *** 0.783 *** 0.773 ** 0.754 *** 0.665 ** 0.609 *** 0.679 *** 0.659 *** 1.000 ***
0.089 0.081 0.075 0.089 0.117 0.093 0.129 0.114 0.108 0.114 0.062
CAL 0.062 0.142 ** 0.127
0.075 0.061 0.091
IFIGDP 0.021 ** -0.059 * 0.026 *** 0.038 *** 0.024 ** -0.019
0.010 0.034 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.070
IFIGDP*CAL 0.075 ** 0.027
0.036 0.065
Quinn 0.138 * 0.057 0.040 -0.024
0.074 0.069 0.099 0.073
IFL*Africa -0.115 ** -0.038
0.046 0.034
IFL*Latin America -0.023 ** -0.057 **
0.009 0.025
IFL*LDC's -0.029 ** -0.055 *
0.014 0.029
BC -0.065 -0.038 -0.073 -0.055 -0.067 -0.029 -0.098 -0.155 ** -0.127 * -0.124 *
0.053 0.038 0.049 0.068 0.069 0.057 0.064 0.067 0.070 0.064
CC 0.412 -0.095 0.183 -0.047 0.049 -0.062 -0.291 -0.266 * -0.366 ** -0.354 **
0.451 0.274 0.315 0.272 0.217 0.263 0.215 0.149 0.187 0.172
Sargan (p-val) 0.526 0.932 0.770 0.594 0.866 0.995 0.925 0.846 0.941 0.999 0.998
m2 (p-val) 0.919 0.765 0.766 0.908 0.364 0.540 0.459 0.890 0.418 0.839 0.038
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 321 317 321 321 209 209 209 313 328 308 261
Countries 65 65 65 65 59 59 59 53 53 53 51
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P
CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH BEKM-PCK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
108 96 71
3 4 5
3 4 5
1
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the log of the end-of-period level of the capital stock in Table 5b and of TFP in Table 6b. All regressors
are log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. Crises Source CK-GH refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and
Glick and Hutchison (2000) respectively. Crises Source BEKM-P refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of Bordo et al. (2000). The sample spans between
1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and standard errors are reported
from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the
second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
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BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P
2
2
International Financial Liberalization and Capital accumulation - DPD - System GMM
Table 7a
International Financial Liberalization and TFP - DPD - System GMM
Table 7b
6 7
BEKM-P
10
GDP_5 0.938 *** 0.917 *** 0.922 *** 0.923 ** 0.880 *** 0.907 *** 0.960 *** 0.898 *** 0.922 *** 0.905 ***
0.031 0.034 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.038 0.027 0.033 0.036 0.031
IFL = CAL 0.022 0.136 0.143 -0.030
0.113 0.136 0.159 0.140
IFL = Quinn 0.407 ** 0.339 *** 0.393 ***
0.175 0.126 0.162
IFL = IFIGDP 0.032 ** 0.036 * 0.034 ** -0.002
0.016 0.019 0.017 0.061
IFIGDP*CAL 0.020
0.070
BC -0.214 *** -0.166 ** -0.148 ** 0.054 0.052 0.061 -0.140 -0.110 -0.106 -0.191 **
0.075 0.068 0.072 0.100 0.082 0.101 0.112 0.091 0.112 0.084
CC -1.073 ** -0.919 *** -1.123 *** -1.078 ** -0.847 *** -1.084 ** -1.139 ** -0.857 -0.383 -0.996 *
0.479 0.337 0.379 0.425 0.209 0.409 0.457 0.542 0.498 0.567
IFL*Africa 0.060 -0.006 -0.084
0.167 0.024 0.068
IFL*Latin America -0.280 -0.097 ** -0.072 *
0.182 0.039 0.039
IFL*LDC's -0.211 -0.019 -0.050
0.191 0.029 0.034
Sargan (p-val) 0.499 0.936 0.451 0.798 0.999 0.979 0.721 0.575 0.533 0.786
m2 (p-val) 0.157 0.154 0.163 0.931 0.546 0.466 0.161 0.163 0.163 0.164
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 337 337 337 216 216 216 341 341 341 337
Countries 69 69 69 60 60 60 69 69 69 69
International Financial Liberalization and GDP - DPD - System GMM
Crises 
Baseline
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Table 8
Crises 
Baseline
Crises 
Baseline
Crises 
Baseline
Crises 
Baseline
Crises 
Baseline
Crises 
Baseline
10
Crises 
Baseline
Crises 
Baseline
Note. The dependent variable is the 5-year log-difference and the log of the end-of-period real GDP. All regressors are log-differences and levels of 5-
year period averages. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step
system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10,
5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from
the second step.
1 2 3 4 5 87
Crises 
Baseline
CAL 0.060 0.017 ** -0.031 -0.017
1.120 2.080 -0.630 -0.800
depins 0.096 * -0.003 0.099 0.000
1.650 -0.510 1.500 -0.020
rgdpch -0.084 *** 0.001 -0.085 *** -0.019 *
-2.790 0.250 -2.560 -1.730
inflation 0.011 *** -0.038 ** 0.010 *** -0.002
2.530 -2.200 2.790 -0.640
openk 0.039 0.009 * 0.003 0.031 **
1.100 1.770 0.080 2.200
grprivo -0.325 *** -0.015 -0.275 *** -0.153 **
-3.390 -1.070 -3.610 -2.300
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.072 0.087 0.024
Obs 1077 1077 1077 1039
CAL 0.399 *** 0.003 *** 0.029 0.061 **
4.850 2.890 0.250 2.270
depins 0.078 0.003 ** -0.113 -0.027
0.660 2.290 -0.620 -1.510
rgdpch -0.129 ** 0.000 -0.131 *** -0.029 ***
-2.200 0.720 -2.550 -3.060
inflation 0.166 *** -0.001 0.164 *** -0.029
3.400 -0.500 3.100 -0.690
openk 0.209 *** 0.002 *** 0.006 0.045 **
2.670 3.070 0.090 2.400
grprivo 0.209 0.002 * 0.085 0.015
0.600 1.830 0.290 0.190
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.381 0.263 0.054
Obs 283 283 283 258
CAL -0.015 0.006 -0.035 -0.036
-0.260 0.340 -0.630 -1.590
depins 0.131 * -0.034 ** 0.218 *** 0.010
1.900 -2.460 3.120 0.460
rgdpch -0.100 *** 0.002 -0.099 *** -0.018
-2.570 0.270 -2.560 -1.330
inflation 0.005 ** -0.048 0.006 ** 0.000
2.030 -1.580 2.300 0.020
openk 0.001 0.009 -0.005 0.021
0.030 0.950 -0.110 1.250
grprivo -0.573 *** -0.035 -0.476 *** -0.258 ***
-4.400 -1.330 -4.130 -3.550
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.064 0.094 0.036
Obs 794 794 794 781
CurrencyAny BC Borderline BC Systemic BC
Systemic BC Currency
Currency
Panel C: Developing Countries
Panel B: Developed Countries
Any BC Borderline BC Systemic BC
Note. The dependent variables are the indicators of banking and currency crises,
that equals 1 if a crisis of a certain type (any banking crisis, borderline BC,
systemic BC or currency crisis) occurs, 0 otherwise. All regressors are in lagged
values. The estimation is performed on yearly observations with probit, and the
coefficients quantify marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by country
and z-statistics are reported below the coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a
coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively. 
Capital account liberalization and financial crises
Table 9a
Panel A: Full Sample
1 2 3 4
Any BC Borderline BC
Quinn 0.164 ** 0.365 0.108 -0.012 0.068 -0.029
2.050 1.310 1.100 -0.270 0.860 -0.420
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.149 0.035 0.009 0.062 0.009
Obs 455 164 291 381 129 252
IFIGDP 0.008 0.117 *** -0.009 -0.040 ** -0.012 -0.067 ***
0.380 2.770 -0.560 -2.040 -0.720 -3.700
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.120 0.048 0.036 0.043 0.052
Obs 1165 315 850 1074 270 804
Quinn -0.013 0.095 -0.001 0.222 *** 0.304 *** 0.079 ***
-0.220 1.110 -0.020 4.720 2.640 3.960
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.666 0.056 0.107 0.223 0.183
Obs 455 164 291 455 164 291
IFIGDP 0.010 0.107 *** -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.600 3.070 -0.540 -0.840 -0.330 -0.650
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.292 0.070 0.048 0.228 0.054
Obs 1165 315 850 1165 315 850
Note. The dependent variables are the indicators of banking and currency crises, that equal 1 if a crisis of
a certain type (any banking crisis, borderline BC, systemic BC or currency crisis) occurs, 0 otherwise. All
covariates of Table 9a, except CAL, are included but not reported. All regressors are in lagged values. The
estimation is performed on yearly observations with probit, and the coefficients quantify marginal effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country and z-statistics are reported below the coefficients. *, ** and ***
indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively. 
Developing
Panel B
5 6
Full Sample Developed Developing Full Sample Developed
Developed Developing
1 2 3 4
3 4 5 6
Any Banking Crisis Currency Crises
International Financial Liberalization and financial crises - yearly panel - dprobit
Table 9b
Panel A
Full Sample Developed Developing Full Sample
Systemic Banking Crises Borderline Banking Crises
1 2
CAL_5year 0.057 0.312 *** 0.004 -0.029 0.031 -0.045
1.200 3.860 0.060 -1.200 1.160 -1.550
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.130 0.059 0.021 0.042 0.029
Obs 1229 315 914 1098 270 828
Quinn_5year 0.077 0.209 0.033 -0.024 0.005 -0.047
1.530 1.210 0.480 -0.910 1.200 -1.330
Pseudo R2 0.350 0.123 0.021 0.021 0.066 0.035
Obs 823 252 571 741 210 531
IFIGDP_5year 0.009 0.095 *** -0.008 -0.032 * -0.006 -0.065 ***
0.450 2.690 -0.530 -1.800 -0.490 -3.350
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.115 0.048 0.032 0.040 0.049
Obs 1165 315 850 1074 270 804
CAL_5year -0.009 -0.023 -0.007 0.182 0.055 ** 0.002
-0.200 -0.200 0.056 1.470 2.140 0.120
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.248 0.072 0.047 0.265 0.055
Obs 1229 315 914 1229 315 914
Quinn_5year -0.042 0.037 -0.074 0.076 *** 0.114 *** 0.076 ***
-0.960 0.550 -1.050 4.350 2.620 3.320
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.358 0.034 0.121 0.278 0.156
Obs 823 252 571 823 252 571
IFIGDP_5year 0.012 0.091 *** -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001
0.710 3.150 -0.540 -0.910 -0.660 -0.550
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.288 0.007 0.048 0.229 0.054
Obs 1165 315 850 1165 315 850
Panel B
Borderline Banking CrisesSystemic Banking Crises
5 6
Full Sample Developed Developing
1
Full Sample Developed Developing
Panel A
2 3 4
Table 9c
International Financial Liberalization and financial crises - yearly panel - dprobit
Any Banking Crisis Currency Crises
Note. The dependent variables are the indicators of banking and currency crises, that equal 1 if a
crisis of a certain type (any banking crisis, borderline BC, systemic BC or currency crisis) occurs, 0
otherwise. All covariates of Table 9a, except CAL, are included in lagged values but not reported.
The indicators of financial integration are the averages of the past 5 years. The estimation is
performed on yearly observations with probit, and the coefficients quantify marginal effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country and z-statistics are reported below the coefficients. *, **
and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively. 
DevelopedFull Sample
1
Full Sample Developed DevelopingDeveloping
3 42 5 6
IFL = CAL -0.092 *** -0.102
0.026 0.065
IFL = IFIGDP -0.017 ** -0.028 ** -0.019 ** -0.058
0.008 0.012 0.008 0.040
IFL= Quinn -0.022
0.049
IFIGDP*CAL 0.026 * 0.049
0.015 0.042
lprivo 0.045 *** 0.043 *** 0.154 *** 0.140 *** 0.043
0.015 0.016 0.045 0.041 0.036
Sargan 0.666 0.955 0.912
m2 0.470 0.427 0.914
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent Yes Yes No No No
Obs 1374 1224 309 305 209
Countries 67 67 67 67 59
IFL = CAL -0.038 ** -0.029
0.019 0.079
IFL = IFIGDP -0.026 *** -0.079 *** 0.006 -0.059 **
0.006 0.009 0.010 0.029
IFL= Quinn -0.002
0.076
IFIGDP*CAL 0.077 *** 0.071 **
0.011 0.033
lprivo 0.024 ** 0.005 0.071 * 0.060 0.107 **
0.012 0.012 0.039 0.040 0.044
Sargan 0.693 0.982 0.975
m2 0.77 0.898 0.503
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent Yes Yes No No No
Obs 1349 1201 300 296 202
Countries 66 66 65 65 58
Note: the dependent variables are physical capital in Panel A and TFP in Panel B,
expressed in log in the difference in difference (D-i-D) estimations, in log and log
difference in the two-step system GMM dynamic panel (DPD) estimates. Banking
and currency crises, and the constant are included in all specifications, the lagged
dependent variable is included in the DPD. All regressors in the DPD are log
differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The sample spans between 1975
and 1999. DPD coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first step, D-
i-D standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is
significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan
overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are
reported from the second step for the DPD.
Panel B. International Financial Liberalization, financial depth and TFP
DPDD-i-D D-i-D
52 3 41
5
DPD
DPD DPD
Table 10a
Panel A. International Financial Liberalization, financial depth and capital
DPD DPDD-i-D D-i-D
1 2 3 4
IFL = CAL 0.134 ** -0.010 0.117 0.401 *
0.046 0.052 0.181 0.221
IFL = IFIGDP -0.042 *** -0.131 *** -0.031 0.028
0.015 0.022 0.023 0.054
IFIGDP*CAL 0.144 *** -0.06
0.028 0.064
IFL= Quinn 0.706 ***
0.151
Sargan 0.786 0.555 0.841 0.767
m2 0.650 0.676 0.637 0.242
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Obs 1291 1239 1239 289 290 287 193
Countries 70 67 67 65 64 64 56
Note: the dependent variable is private credit over GDP, expressed in log in the difference in
difference (D-i-D) estimations, in log and log difference in the two-step system GMM dynamic panel
(DPD) estimates. Banking and currency crises, and the constant are included in all specifications, the
lagged dependent variable is included in the DPD. All regressors in the DPD are log differences and
levels of 5-year period averages. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. DPD coefficients and
standard errors are reported from the first step, D-i-D standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate 
that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan
overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the second
step for the DPD.
International Financial Liberalization and financial depth
Table 10b
D-i-D D-i-D DPD DPD DPD
72 6
DPD
1 4 53
D-i-D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
IFL=CAL -2.864 ** 2.421 -3.972 ** 2.382
1.439 2.274 1.826 4.814
IFL=IFIGDP -0.345 3.963 *** 0.355 6.357
0.332 0.979 0.435 5.929
IFIGDP*CAL -4.410 *** -6.033
1.011 5.906
IFL=Quinn -1.650 -2.895 ***
1.519 1.038
BC 7.129 *** 7.406 *** 6.750 *** 8.981 *** -0.817 -0.511 -1.499 -0.17
2.475 2.660 2.072 2.802 2.365 2.145 3.055 1.345
CC -5.689 -5.703 -1.013 -7.444 -11.075 -3.805 2.583 -4.708
9.868 9.241 8.148 10.086 8.453 7.220 9.71 5.436
R2 0.205 0.163 0.334 0.232 0.035 0.010 0.131 0.134
Obs 67 67 67 59 70 67 67 60
Note: OLS cross-sectional regressions of the standard deviation of real GDP growth and TFP on the means of the IFL 
indicators, banking and currency crises, 1975-1999. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 
that coefficients are significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
Table 11
Financial integration and volatility - Cross-section (1975-1999)
sd(dlogGDP) sd(dlogTFP)
